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Small and informal firms account for a large share of employment in developing 
countries. The rapid expansion of microfinance services is based on the belief that these 
firms have productive investment opportunities and can enjoy high returns to capital if 
given the opportunity. However, measuring the return to capital is complicated by 
unobserved factors such as entrepreneurial ability and demand shocks, which are likely to 
be correlated with capital stock. We use a randomized experiment to overcome this 
problem, and to measure the return to capital for the average microenterprise in our 
sample, regardless of whether or not they apply for credit. We accomplish this by 
providing cash and equipment grants to small firms in Sri Lanka, and measuring the 
increase in profits arising from this exogenous (positive) shock to capital stock. After 
controlling for possible spillover effects, we find the average real return to capital to be 
5.7 percent per month, substantially higher than the market interest rate. We then 
examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects to explore whether missing credit markets 
or missing insurance markets are the most likely cause of the high returns. Returns are 
found to vary with entrepreneurial ability and with measures of other sources of cash 
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Small and informal firms are the source of employment for large sectors of the 
labor force in many developing countries. A key question of interest is whether these 
firms hold the potential for income growth for their owners, or whether they merely 
represent subsistence sources of incomes for low-productivity individuals unable to find 
alternative sources of work. Evidence that some firms have high marginal returns is seen 
in the very high interest rates paid by some individuals to moneylenders, and by literature 
which identifies the effect of credit shocks on those who apply for credit (see Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2005 for an excellent recent summary). However, the sample of firms who 
apply for credit or who belong to microfinance organizations may not represent the full 
universe of firms for any number of reasons.
1 In this paper we use a randomized 
experiment to identify the marginal return to capital for all firms, irrespective of whether 
or not they choose to apply for credit at market interest rates. We then examine the 
heterogeneity of returns in order to test which theories can explain why firms may have 
marginal returns well above the market interest rate. 
We accomplish this by surveying microenterprises in Sri Lanka and providing 
small grants to a randomly selected subset of the sampled firms. The grants were either 
10,000 Sri Lankan rupees (about $100), or 20,000 rupees (about $200). Half the grants 
were given in the form of cash, and the other half in the form of equipment or inventories 
selected by the entrepreneurs. We purposely restricted our survey to small firms with less 
than 100,000 rupees (about $1000) in capital other than land and buildings. The median 
level of capital investment among firms in the sample is about 18,000 rupees. The capital 
shocks provided were therefore large relative to the size of the firms, with the larger 
shock equal to more than 100 percent of the median level of invested capital.  
An accurate estimate of returns to capital in small enterprises is important for 
understanding both the limitations and the potential of microenterprises to play a role in 
increasing income levels in developing countries. If returns are very low at low levels of 
capital stock, then this would indicate that capital is an important barrier to opening a 
                                                 
1 These reasons include both selection among entrepreneurs as to whether or not to apply for credit, 
determined by factors such as their attitudes to risk, access to alternative sources of finance, perceptions of 
the returns on investment, and expectations of getting a loan; as well as selection on the part of the lender 
as to which firms to accept as clients.   3
business. Low returns would suggest that individuals without access to a sufficient 
amount of capital would face a permanent disadvantage. That is, they would fall into a 
poverty trap. The theoretical literature on occupational choice has posited a minimum 
scale below which returns to capital are very low or even zero.
2  
If, on the other hand, returns are high at low levels of capital stock, then an 
entrepreneur would be able to open a business and grow by reinvesting profits. In this 
case, firms might remain at a sub-optimal size for some period of time, but entrepreneurs 
would not be permanently disadvantaged. With time, they would be able to bootstrap 
their way up to an optimal firm size. In the absence of minimum scale, we might expect 
returns to be high. Because small scale entrepreneurs lack access to credit at market 
interest rates, even risk-adjusted returns may well be higher than market interest rates.  
Given the importance of this issue, there are an increasing number of estimates of 
the returns to capital in small scale productive activities in developing countries (see 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). Some of the estimates come from broad cross-sections of 
producers, and others from the subset of firms exposed to some shock. Among the 
former, McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) estimate returns to capital among the smallest 
urban microenterprises in Mexico, those with less than $US200 invested, of around 15 
percent per month. Monthly returns in the Mexican data fall to around 3-5 percent above 
the $500 range, equivalent to 40-80 percent annually. Udry and Anagol (2006) estimate 
returns to capital in a sample of small scale agricultural producers in Ghana to be 50 
percent per year among those producing traditional crops on a median-sized plot and 250 
percent per year among those producing non-traditional crops on median sized plots. 
Banerjee and Duflo (2004), on the other hand, take advantage of a panel of firms in India 
during a period in which changes in laws forced banks to make preferential loans to 
certain groups of firms. The changes in the laws allows for the identification of changes 
in access to finance among the firms. Banerjee and Duflo derive estimates of returns for 
this set of firms of between 74 and 100 percent per year.  
The central challenge in estimating returns to capital is that the optimal level of 
capital stock is likely to depend on attributes of entrepreneurial ability which are difficult 
                                                 
2 Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997) are seminal papers in this literature. Barrett 
and Swallow (2004) discuss the effects of minimum scale on investment in rural Africa..    4
to measure. Banerjee and Duflo point to one way around this problem—exploiting an 
exogenous shock which is uncorrelated with entrepreneurial ability. But this approach has 
a downside, in that the sample is limited to firms or entrepreneurs exposed to the shock. 
In the case of Banerjee and Duflo’s estimates, the estimates apply only to those firms 
applying for credit. This resolves one problem at the cost of creating another: While 
estimated returns are less subject to ability bias among this subsample of firms, self-
selection of the subsample suggests the returns likely overstate those for the full spectrum 
of firms. Low returns to capital are only one of several possible reasons entrepreneurs 
may fail to apply for loans. Thus, we should be interested in returns in the broader sample 
of firms. 
The difficulty of obtaining an unbiased estimate of returns to capital across all 
firms in a sector is the motivation for the field experiment on which the data used in this 
paper are based. We use random grants of either cash or equipment to generate changes 
in capital against which changes in revenues and profits can be measured. Randomized 
experiments have quickly become an important part of the toolkit of development 
economics (Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer, 2006), although this is the first experiment 
we are aware of involving payments to firms, rather than households or schools. The 
random allocation of the grants ensures that the changes in capital stock are uncorrelated 
with entrepreneurial ability, demand shocks, and other factors associated with the 
differences in the profitability of investments across firms. However, a further condition 
for randomization to consistently identify the return to capital is that there are no 
spillover effects from treated to untreated firms. We use GPS location data to control for 
the number of firms in the same industry within a given radius of each firm. We find 
evidence for spillover effects of the treatment of firms in the bamboo industry, but not for 
the remaining firms. 
We first use the data to estimate the impact of the random capital shocks on the 
profits of the firms, and estimate a real marginal return on capital for the average firm in 
our sample after controlling for spillover effects. We next use the two different sizes of 
treatment to test whether returns are linear, increasing, or decreasing in the size of the 
treatment amount. We estimate the average real return to capital to be around 5.7 percent   5
per month, much higher than the market interest rate, and cannot rule out linearity in 
returns. 
We then set out a model consistent with our data which can be used to investigate 
the proximate causes of such high returns to capital. The two main theories we consider 
are imperfect credit markets and imperfect insurance markets. Examination of the 
heterogeneity of treatment effects leads us to find that returns to capital are higher for 
entrepreneurs with higher ability and with fewer other wage workers in the household. 
We do not find significant interaction effects consistent with risk aversion or uncertainty 
limiting investment in the enterprise. This suggests that the reason for high returns to 
capital is missing credit markets rather than missing insurance markets, and that the 
household internal capital market is a binding constraint. 
We begin by describing the experiment. We follow in Section 3 with a description 
of the data. Section 4 estimates the treatment effect and Section 5 the return to capital. 
Sections 6 and 7 consider robustness to spillovers, attrition, reporting differences, 
different treatments, and nonlinearities. In Section 8, we develop a simple model of 
household investment which incorporates both the riskiness of investment and factors 
affecting the shadow value of capital. The model provides several testable implications, 
which we confront with the data. Section 9 concludes.  
 
2. Description of Experiment 
Selection of the participants 
We carried out a baseline survey of microenterprises in April 2005 as the first 
wave of the Sri Lanka Microenterprise Survey (SLMS).
3 Four additional waves of the 
panel survey were then conducted at quarterly intervals. The survey took place in three 
Southern and South-Western districts of Sri Lanka: Kalutara, Galle and Matara. The 
survey is designed to also study the process of recovery of microenterprises from the 
December 26, 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and so these districts were selected as ones 
where coastal areas had received some tsunami damage. We set out to draw a sample of 
firms with invested capital of 100,000 rupees (about US$1000) or less, excluding 
                                                 
3 Fieldwork was carried out by ACNielsen Lanka (Pvt) Ltd.   6
investments in land and buildings. This size cut-off was chosen in order that our 
treatments (described below) would be a large shock to business capital. 
We began by using the 2001 Sri Lankan Census to select 25 Grama Niladhari 
divisions (GNs) in these three districts. A GN is an administrative unit containing on 
average around 400 households. We used the Census to select GNs with a high 
percentage of own-account workers and modest education levels, since these were most 
likely to yield enterprises with invested capital below the threshold we had set. The GNs 
were stratified according to whether the area was directly affected, indirectly affected, or 
unaffected by the tsunami. A door-to-door screening survey was then carried out among 
households in each of the selected GNs. This survey was given to 3361 households, with 
less than 1 percent of households refusing to be listed. The screening survey identified 
self employed workers outside of agriculture, transportation, fishing, and professional 
services who were between the ages of 20 and 65 and had no paid employees. 
The full survey was given to 659 enterprises meeting these criteria. After 
reviewing the baseline survey data, we eliminated 41 enterprises either because they 
exceeded the 100,000 rupee maximum size or because a follow-up visit could not verify 
the existence of an enterprise. The remaining 618 firms constitute the baseline sample. 
For the purposes of this paper we exclude the firms which were directly affected by the 
tsunami, since the recovery of assets damaged by the tsunami might affect returns to 
capital. This gives a baseline sample of 405 firms which were not directly affected by the 
tsunami. The remainder of the paper will focus only on these firms. 
The 405 firms are almost evenly split across two broad industry categories, with 
203 firms in retail sales and 202 in manufacturing/services. Firms in retail sales are 
typically small grocery stores. The manufacturing/services firms cover a range of 
common occupations of microenterprises in Sri Lanka, including sewing clothing, 
making lace products, making bamboo products, repairing bicycles, and making food 
products such as hoppers and string hoppers.  
 
The Experiment 
The aim of our experiment was to randomly provide firms with a positive shock 
to their capital stock, and measure the impact of this on business profits. Firms were told   7
before the initial survey that as compensation for participating in the survey, we would 
conduct a random prize drawing, with prizes of cash or equipment for the business. The 
prize consisted of one of four grants: 10,000 Sri Lankan rupees (~$100) in equipment for 
their business, 20,000 rupees in equipment, 10,000 rupees in cash, or 20,000 rupees in 
cash. In the case of equipment grants, the equipment was selected by the enterprise 
owner, and purchased by research assistants working for the project.
4  
After the first round of the survey, 124 firms were randomly selected to receive a 
treatment, with 84 receiving a 10,000 treatment and 40 receiving a 20,000 treatment. The 
randomization was done within district (Kalutara, Galle, and Matara) and zone 
(unaffected and indirectly affected by the tsunami). A second lottery was held after the 
third round of the survey, with an additional 104 firms selected at random from among 
those who didn’t receive treatment after the first round: 62 receiving the 10,000 treatment 
and 42 the 20,000 treatment. In each case half the firms receiving a treatment amount 
received cash, and the other half equipment. Allocation to treatment was done ex ante, 
and as a result, there were an additional seven firms who were assigned to receive 
treatment after round 3, but who had attrited from the survey by then.  
The 10,000 rupee treatment was equivalent to about three months of median 
profits reported by the firms in the sample, and the larger treatment equivalent to six 
months of median profits. The median initial level of invested capital, excluding land and 
buildings, was about 18,000 rupees, implying the small and large treatments correspond 
to approximately 55 percent and 110 percent of the median initial invested capital. By 
either measure, the treatment amounts were large relative to the size of the firms.  
Although the amount offered for the equipment treatment was either 10,000 
rupees or 20,000 rupees, in practice the amount spent on inventories and equipment 
sometimes differed from this amount. Among those receiving equipment, only a handful 
of firms spent less than the amount we offered. Only four of the 116 firms receiving 
equipment treatments spent as much as 50 rupees ($0.50) less than the amount we 
                                                 
4 In order to purchase the equipment for these entrepreneurs receiving equipment treatments, research 
assistants visited several firms in the evening to inform them they had won an equipment prize. The 
winning entrepreneurs were asked what they wanted to buy with the money, and where they would 
purchase it. The research assistants then arranged to meet them at the market where the goods were to be 
purchased at a specified time the next day. Thus, the goods purchased and the place/market where they 
were purchased were chosen by the entrepreneurs with no input from the research assistants. 
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offered. One of those spent 1200 less than we offered, one about 2500 less and the other 
two about 100 less than we offered. More commonly, the entrepreneurs contributed funds 
of their own to purchase a larger item. This occurred in 65 of the 116 equipment 
treatments. However, in most cases, the amount contributed by the entrepreneurs was 
trivial. In two-thirds of these cases (44 out of 65), the extra spending was less than 500 
rupees, or $5. In 11 percent of the equipment treatments (13), the entrepreneurs 
contributed 2000 or more rupees from other sources. In three of those cases, their 
contribution was more than 10,000 rupees. We use the amount offered rather than the 
amount spent in our analysis of the effects of treatment. We have both receipts and 
pictures of all of the goods purchased with the equipment grants. Approximately 57 
percent of the goods purchased were inventories or raw materials, 39 percent machinery 
or equipment, and 4 percent construction materials for buildings.  
Cash treatments were given without restrictions. Those receiving cash were told 
that they could purchase anything they wanted, whether for their business or for other 
purposes. In reality, the grant was destined to be unrestricted because we lacked the 
ability to monitor what they did with the funds, and because cash is fungible. We felt that 
being explicit about the lack of restriction was likely to lead to more honest reporting 
regarding use of the funds. In the survey subsequent to the treatment, we asked what they 
had done with the treatment.
5 Approximately 58 percent of the cash treatments were 
invested in the business between the time of the treatment and the subsequent survey.  An 
additional 12 percent was saved, 6 percent was used to repay loans, 5 percent on 
expenditures for the household, 4 percent on repairs to the house, 3 percent on equipment 
or inventories for another business, and the remaining 12 percent on “other items.” Of the 
amount invested in the enterprise, about two-thirds was invested in inventories and one-
third in equipment.   
 
Verifying Randomization 
Table 1 compares the baseline characteristics of firms ever assigned to treatment 
with those firms always in the control group. In general the randomization appears to 
                                                 
5 Our question noted that some entrepreneurs had told us they had spent the money on furniture or other 
items for the household, some had spent it on food and clothing, and some had invested in their business. In 
fact, they had told us this during piloting of the round 2 survey.   9
have worked in creating groups which are comparable in terms of baseline 
characteristics. There is no significant difference in the baseline profits, revenue, capital 
stock, age, and level of informality of the treated and untreated firms. The age, education, 
parental background, and risk aversion are similar for owners in both groups. The only 
significant difference between the two groups occurs for a household durable asset index, 
with firm owners in the control group having slightly higher mean baseline assets. To test 
for joint significance of all these variables, we estimate a probit model of whether or not 
a firm is assigned to treatment as a function of the 16 baseline characteristics given in the 
Table. The p-value from the chi-squared test is 0.355, so that we can not reject the null 
hypothesis that these observable characteristics do not help predict whether or not a firm 
was assigned to treatment. 
 
3. Data/Survey 
The baseline survey gathered detail information on the firm and the characteristics 
of the firm owner. The main outcome variable of interest in this paper is the profits of the 
firm. Firm profits were elicited directly from the firm by asking: 
“What was the total income the business earned during March after paying 
all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income 
you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during 
March?” 
 
The reported mean and median profits in the baseline are 3900 rupees and 3000 
rupees respectively. The survey also asked detailed questions on revenues and expenses. 
Profits calculated as reported revenues minus reported expenses are lower, around 2500 
at the mean and 1350 at the median. Profits calculated in this manner are positively 
correlated with reported profits, with a correlation coefficient of 0.32. This is about the 
same level as one finds in other microenterprise surveys. In de Mel, McKenzie and 
Woodruff (2007), we analyze the measurement of profits in some detail, reporting on 
experiments conducted with different questions, bookkeeping, and monitoring of sales. 
The biggest reason reported and calculated profits differ is a mismatch of the timing of 
purchases and the sales associated with those purchases. Some of the expenses in one   10
month are associated with sales the following month. Correcting for this mistiming 
increases the correlation with reported profits to around 0.70. We conclude from the more 
detailed analysis of measurement issues that the reported profit is the best measure of the 
firm’s profitability, and we use those data for the remainder of this paper. 
The baseline survey also gathered detailed information on the replacement cost of 
assets used in the enterprise, and whether they were owned or rented. 99 percent of assets 
excluding land and buildings are owned by the enterprises. The majority of assets owned 
by the enterprises are land and buildings. In the baseline sample, these average 121,000 
rupees ($1200), though about a sixth (15 percent) of firms report they own no assets in 
this category. The firms also reported an average of 14,400 ($145) rupees worth of 
machinery and equipment and 13,000 ($130) in inventories.   
In each subsequent round of the survey, we then asked firms to report on the 
purchase of new assets, the disposition of assets by sale or damage, and the repair and 
return to service of assets. These are used to calculate a change in assets over the quarter. 
Combined with the data from each previous quarter, these data allow us to estimate 
investment levels by category for each quarter of the survey. Note that the data are not 
adjusted for depreciation of machinery and equipment. Given the relatively short period 
over which the data are gathered and the high percentage of assets invested in 
inventories, we do not see this as a major concern. The survey also asks the current value 
of inventories of raw material, work in progress and final goods each quarter.  
We began with 405 firms in the baseline survey, and still had 384 of the firms in 
the survey by the fifth wave, an attrition rate of only 5.2 percent. However, only 388 of 
the 405 firms reported profits in the first wave, 390 in the second wave, 381 in the third, 
366 in the fourth, and 366 in the fifth. We concentrate our analysis on the unbalanced 
panel of 383 firms reporting at least three waves of profit data. Fifteen of the firms 
assigned to the control group and 7 of the firms assigned to the treatment group attrited 
from the sample before reporting at least three waves of profit data. We show our results 
are robust to this attrition.  
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4. Estimation of the Mean Treatment Effect  
We begin by assuming each enterprise is characterized by a linear production 
function, and that the treatments have homogeneous effects on the enterprises. We later 
relax both of these assumptions. Estimating the mean effect of treatment on business 
profits requires estimating for firm i in period t: 
t i
s
s t i t i AMOUNT PROFITS ,
5
2
, , ε δ β α + + + = ∑
=
     ( 1 )  
Where AMOUNTi,t is an indicator of how much treatment firm i had received at time t, 
coded in terms of 10,000 rupees. AMOUNT therefore takes value 1 if the firm received 
the 10,000 rupee treatment, 2 if the firm received the 20,000 rupee treatment, and 0 
otherwise. The δs are period effects. Table 1 showed that the randomization appears to 
have worked, giving treatment and control groups which are comparable in terms of 
observable baseline characteristics. Hence the expected correlation between the error 
term εi,t and treatment status is zero. We can therefore estimate equation (1) using random 
effects, which assumes  εi,t to be uncorrelated with treatment status, but allows it to be 
correlated over time. Alternatively, we can use fixed-effects estimation, which will 
improve the precision of the estimates by capturing any time-invariant characteristics of 
the firm which affect business profits.  
The first row of Table 2 presents the resulting treatment effects on nominal 
profits. Column 1 shows the random effects estimate and Column 2 the fixed effects 
estimate. The coefficients show a 10,000 rupee treatment increased monthly profits by 
489 to 569 rupees, a monthly nominal return on the treatment of 4.9 to 5.7 percent, with 
these treatment effects significant at the 5 percent level. The profits data are noisy, and so 
Columns 3 and 4 present results after trimming outliers. In Column 3 we trim firms with 
monthly nominal profits below 200 rupees or above 25,000 rupees, corresponding to the 
1
st and 99
th percentiles of the nominal profits distribution. This increased the estimated 
nominal return on the treatment to 6.1 percent, now significant at the 1 percent level. A 
firm that always has profits above 25,000 rupees is likely to just be a very productive 
firm, whereas a firm whose profits change from 1500 to 30,000 to 2000 could be one in 
which misreporting occurred. Column 4 therefore presents our preferred specification, 
which trims firms on the basis of extremely large changes in profits. We trim firms where   12
the change in monthly profits from one quarter to the next was less than -90 percent or 
greater than 962 percent, corresponding to the 1
st and 99
th percentiles of the distribution 
of changes in profits. The estimated nominal return on the treatment is 5.9 percent per 
month after this trimming. 
Inflation in Sri Lanka was low over the period studied, with point-to-point 
inflation of 4.0 percent between March 2005 and March 2006. The second row of Table 2 
examines the treatment effect on real profits, where the monthly Sri Lanka Consumers’ 
Price Index was used to deflate nominal profits.
6 After trimming based on extreme 
changes in profits, we see that the real monthly increase in profits was 5.7 percent of the 
treatment amount.  
 
Impact on Labor Hours  
This treatment effect represents the increase in real monthly profits from our 
treatment. The treatment increased capital stock. However, labor hours may have also 
have been affected if firm owners adjusted their own labor hours, or if the resulting rise 
in profits caused owners to substitute towards leisure. We therefore empirically 
investigate the impact of the treatment on labor hours by estimating equation (1), using 
own labor hours and family worker labor hours as the dependent variables.
7 The 
treatment is found to have a positive and significant impact on own labor hours: a 10,000 
rupee treatment increases own weekly hours by 3.4 hours (t=3.23, p=0.001). There is a 
small and insignificant negative impact on family labor hours (a -0.7 hour per week 
effect, p=0.467).  
Recall that business profits include the earnings of the firm owner. Hence the 
increase in real profits from the treatment reflects both the return to the additional capital, 
and the return to the owner of the additional labor hours worked. To isolate the impact of 
capital, we need to subtract the implicit wage earned by the firm owner. We estimate the 
marginal return to own labor by using the baseline data to regress profits on capital stock 
(exclusive of land and buildings), age of the owner, owner’s education, a dummy for the 
                                                 
6 Source: Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk/price/slcpi/slcpi_monthly.htm [accessed February 17, 2007]. 
7 Recall that none of the firms had paid non-family workers in the baseline, and less than 5 percent of firms 
had non-family workers at any time during the panel survey.   13
owner being female, and the owner’s monthly labor hours. The coefficient on owner’s 
labor hours is 5.43 (p=0.003), implying a 5.43 rupee per hour marginal return to an hour 
of work. Valuing a labor hour at 5.43 rupees implies that approximately 11 percent of the 
firm-period real net profit observations are negative.  
The third row of Table 2 then examines the impact of the treatment on real net 
profits, using this adjustment for labor hours. The treatment effect is still positive and 
significant in all specifications. The fourth column shows that after trimming outliers, the 
treatment effect corresponds to a 5.0 percent real increase in monthly net profits. 
Finally, in the fourth row of Table 2, we carry out an extreme adjustment of 
profits for labor hours. The median profit per hour worked in the baseline is 14.1 rupees 
per hour. Taking this as the implicit wage rate assumes that there is no return to capital in 
the baseline, only to labor, and therefore we consider this as an extreme upper bound on 
the implicit wage. Indeed, 37 percent of the firm-period observations on net profits are 
negative after this adjustment, which appears too high. Even after using this extreme 
adjustment, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 still show a positive treatment effect, significant 
at the 10 percent level. The real return is 3.9 to 4.1 percent per month, interpreted as the 
return on the treatment after accounting for the return on additional labor hours induced 
by the treatment. 
Overall, Table 2 shows the treatment had a significant and positive effect on firm 
profits, increasing real monthly profits by 5.7 percent, and increasing real monthly net 
profits by 5.0 percent after valuing the increase in labor hours at 5.43 rupees per hour. 
For the remainder of our analysis we will use this real net profit as our dependent 
variable. Similar results are obtained if we use real profits.  
 
5. Estimation of the Return to Capital 
The above results show the return to the experiment of giving cash or equipment to firm 
owners. While such an experiment may be informative of the likely impact of a 
government welfare program akin to conditional cash transfer programs used for 
education, our main interest lies in using the experiment to measure the return to capital. 
This requires estimating:   14
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where the treatment amount offered to firms is used to instrument capital stock, Ki,t.   
Table 3 reports the estimated return to capital from estimating equation (2). 
Columns 1 through 4 repeat the specifications used in Table 2, using random effects, 
fixed effects, trimming the level of profits, and trimming changes in profits. Columns 5 
through 8 adjust for potential outliers in capital stock, by additionally trimming the top 
and bottom 1 percent of initial capital stocks. After trimming profits we get real returns to 
capital in the 6.8-6.9 percent per month range, which increase to 7.3-7.4 percent once we 
trim outliers in initial capital stock. 
The lower panel of Table 3 shows the coefficient on the treatment amount in the 
first stage regression for capital stock. The treatment amount is a strongly significant 
predictor of changes in capital stock (F-statistic always above 41), with each 1000 rupees 
of treatment increasing capital stock by 744-800 rupees. This explains why the return on 
capital is higher than the treatment effect, since the change in capital stock is less than the 
treatment amount.  
  
6. Controlling for potential Treatment Spillovers 
The key condition for randomization to provide us with a valid estimate of the 
treatment effect and of returns to capital is the standard unit treatment value assumption, 
which requires that the potential outcomes for each firm are independent of its treatment 
status, and of the treatment status of any other firm (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996). As 
Miguel and Kremer (2004) and Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2006) note, the presence 
of spillovers can cause this assumption to be violated, leading to biased estimates of the 
treatment effect. It is therefore important to test for spillover effects arising from our 
grants to firms. 
We collected the GPS coordinates of each firm in our survey, taking advantage of 
improvements in precision and technology which allow location to be measured 
accurately to within 15 meters, 95 percent of the time (Gibson and McKenzie, 2007). 
This allows us to construct a measure of the number of treated firms in the same industry 
at any given point in time within a given radius of each firm. In our baseline survey, the   15
median firm reported that 80 percent of its revenue came from customers within 1 
kilometer of the business. With this in mind, we examine the effects of treatments 
provided to firms in a radius of either 500 meters or 1 kilometer from each firm. After the 
second set of treatments, the median firm in our sample has one firm in its industry 
treated within 500m, and also one firm treated within 1km. The means are 1.8 firms 
within 500m and 3.1 firms within 1km.  
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where Ni,t
d is the number of treated firms in the same industry within radius d of firm i at 
time t.  The average overall treatment effect on profits for treated firms is then 
d N λ β +  
where 
d N  is the average number of treated firms in neighborhood of distance d of a 
treated firm.  We likewise augment the returns to capital regression in equation (2) to 
include this spillover effect. The estimated returns to capital will be just the coefficient β 
on capital, which gives the marginal impact on profits of a change in capital, controlling 
for any firms getting treated nearby. Because the mean number of treated firms within 
500 meters is identical in the sample of treated and untreated firms, each treatment 
negatively affects other treated and control firms in an identical manner, implying that β 
remains the estimated return on changes in capital stock.    
Table 4 then reports the results of estimating (3). Columns (1) and (3) show a 
negative and significant spillover effect when estimating the treatment effect and return 
to capital respectively. Each treated firm within 500 meters lowers profits by 138-151 
rupees. This reduces the overall treatment effect from 504 to 294 rupees for the mean 
treated firm. However, even after controlling for the number of firms treated within the 
neighborhood of a firm, the estimated return to capital is very close to that estimated in 
Table 3: 7.5 percent. The spillover effects are insignificant when we consider a 
neighborhood of radius 1 kilometer around the firm, although are similar in size when 
taken at the mean.  
The distribution of the number of firms within a neighborhood of a treated firm is 
highly skewed. When we examine this by industry, we find that the bamboo industry is 
an outlier. All of our 29 bamboo product firms are located in two adjacent G.N.s, and the   16
median (mean) bamboo firm has 12 (10) treated bamboo firms within 500 meters by 
round 5 of our survey. In contrast, all other industries have mean and median number of 
treated firms of 3 or less in wave 5. Columns 5 through 8 of Table 4 repeat the spillover 
analysis on a sample excluding the bamboo industry. The spillover effect shrinks in 
magnitude and is no longer statistically significant. This exclusion does cause the 
treatment effect and the estimated return to capital to fall, although the real return to 
capital is still significant at the 5 percent level and estimated to be 5.7 percent per month.
8 
The significant spillovers therefore seem confined to the bamboo industry. These 
firms produce items such as baskets, mats, and food covers out of bamboo. There are 
restrictions imposed by the government on the harvesting of bamboo, limiting the supply 
of raw materials. Several of the firms wished to buy raw materials with the equipment 
treatments we provided, but were not able to buy 10,000 or 20,000 rupees of bamboo at 
once from suppliers. They therefore paid the suppliers as advance payment for future 
supplies. In doing so, it is likely that they crowded out the supplies of other firms in the 
same industry. Combined with the heavy density of firms within one area, this may 
explain the significant negative spillover effects in this industry.  
These results suggest that the firms in the bamboo industry are different from the 
remaining firms in the sample. We therefore exclude these 29 firms for the remainder of 
the analysis. What happens to our main treatment effects and estimated return to capital 
once we exclude bamboo, limiting the sample to the firms without significant treatment 
spillovers? Table 5 repeats our preferred specifications in Tables 2 and 3 after excluding 
bamboo. The treatment effect is estimated to result in a 381-409 rupee increase in real 
adjusted monthly profits. The real return to capital is estimated to be 5.7 percent per 
month. This effect is the same as seen in columns 7 and 8 of Table 4, and is therefore 




                                                 
8 A spillover radius of 100 meters produces results which are similar in all respects to the radius of 500m. 
Spillovers are significant for the full sample, but insignficant once the bamboo sector is excluded. The 
coefficient is larger, reflecting the fact that many fewer firms have a treated enterprise within 100m. These 
results are available from the authors upon request.    17
7. Further Robustness 
Robustness to Attrition  
The attrition rate in the SLMS was remarkably low for a five-wave panel survey. 
Nevertheless, the combination of attrition, missing profit data, trimming capital stock, 
and trimming firms with large changes in profits reduces our sample of non-bamboo 
firms from 376 to 325 firms. Of the 51 firms which are dropped, 24 were assigned to 
treatment and 27 to the control group. This corresponds to a broad attrition rate 
(including both attritors and those dropped for missing or noisy data) of 11.1 percent for 
the treated, and 16.9 percent for the control group. To examine the robustness of our 
results to this differential attrition, we use the bounding approach of Lee (2005) to 
construct upper and lower bounds for the treatment effect. 
The key identifying assumption required for implementing the Lee (2005) bounds 
is a monotonicity assumption which assumes that treatment assignment affects sample 
selection only in one direction. In our context, it requires assuming that there are some 
firms who would have attrited if they had not been assigned to treatment, but that firms 
do not attrit because of being assigned to treatment. This seems plausible in our context, 
since firms receiving treatment may stay in the sample when they would otherwise have 
attrited as a result of a business failure being prevented, or to an increased willingness to 
answer our survey question. It does not appear likely that receiving treatment would have 
caused some firms to drop out of the survey that would not have dropped out if they had 
remained in the control group.
9 
To construct the Lee (2005) bounds we then trim the distribution of profits for the 
group assigned to treatment by the difference in attrition rates between the two groups as 
a proportion of the retention rate of the group assigned to treatment. In our application, 
this requires trimming the upper or lower 6.5 percent of the adjusted profits distribution 
for the group assigned to treatment. Doing this then gives a lower bound for the treatment 
effect of 348 rupees and an upper bound of 399 rupees. The returns regressions 
                                                 
9 Of course attrition from our estimation sample also arises from an outlier change in profits. Conceivably 
the treatment might cause a large increase in profits, making attrition for this reason more likely. However, 
it would have to increase profits by more than 962 percent in order to do this, and if this were the case, 
dropping such observations will only lower the estimated treatment effect.    18
corresponding to these treatment effects are 627 rupees and 584 rupees respectively.
10 
Thus attrition can at most lower our treatment effect from 3.8 percent to 3.5 percent, with 
this only occurring in the unlikely event that it is the most profitable control firms 
attriting. Moreover, even in this case, our estimated return to capital is still 5.7 percent. 
Thus the estimated return to capital appears robust to corrections for attrition. 
 
Robustness to Reporting Effects 
Our main outcome of interest is the profits reported by the firm – one item in a 
series of questions about income and expenditure asked midway through our 
questionnaire. A potential concern is that firms change their reporting of profits in the 
survey as a result of the treatment, in which case the measured returns do not correspond 
to actual returns. There are two potential elements of this concern. The first is that firms 
might deliberately overreport profits after receiving the treatment. The second is that 
treatment makes firms trust us more, and therefore makes them less likely to underreport. 
We address each in turn. 
Deliberate overreporting of profits in response to treatment is likely to be a 
concern in evaluation of business loans or business training programs, where firms who 
wish to receive more help from the program in the future wish to show that they are 
benefiting from the treatment they have received. We believe this to be less of a concern 
in our experiment for several reasons. The first is that the treatment was presented to the 
firm as a “prize” received for participating in a survey, not as a loan or program offered 
to them. Firms were told these prizes were awarded randomly, and had no reason to think 
future prizes would be forthcoming on the basis of how they used the present prize. 
Secondly, if firms were deliberately overreporting how much use the prize had been to 
their business, we would expect them to overreport the share of the cash prize which they 
had invested in their business. However, as noted above, on average firms report only 
investing 58 percent of the cash treatment in the business, and saving an additional 12 
percent. When we estimate the returns to capital just for the cash treatment, the first stage 
                                                 
10 Trimming treated firms in the top or bottom 6.5 percent of profits also leads to a change in the first-stage 
coefficients. Trimming the most profitable firms lowers the first-stage coefficient on amount from 0.80 to 
0.75. This more than counteracts the reduction in the treatment effect, leading to an estimated return to 
capital which is higher than that which occurs when we trim the least profitable firms (where the first-stage 
coefficient is 0.81).   19
coefficient on the cash amount is 0.76. Thus the 70 percent of the cash treatment that 
owners say they invest in the business or save is approximately the amount we find 
capital stock to increase by, and certainly does not appear an overstatement. Therefore it 
appears that firm owners are responding honestly to the question of how they invest the 
cash, making it likely they are also not deliberately overreporting profits. 
The second potential concern is that the receipt of a prize makes firms trust our 
survey team more, and alleviate concerns about the possibility of the survey somehow 
being affiliated with tax collection.
11 Our survey provides two checks on whether 
reporting changed with treatment. As a first check, we can use the fact that firms were 
asked for March 2005 sales twice: once in the baseline sample before any treatments 
were administered, and again in the second round, after the first group of firms had 
received treatment. We take the ratio of the round 2 report of sales to the round 1 report, 
and test whether this differs according to whether firms received treatment between the 
two rounds. The mean ratio is 1.296 for treated firms and 1.306 for untreated firms, with 
a t-test of equality having a p-value of 0.963. Thus in both cases firms increased their 
report of sales compared to the first round, but this had no relationship to treatment 
status. 
As a second check on whether reporting changed with treatment, we can use the 
fourth round questionnaire, taken in January 2006, which asked about sales for October, 
November, and December 2005. The second round of treatments occurred in November 
2005. We can then test whether the January 2006 reporting of October sales differs for 
firms treated in November compared to never-treated firms. Mean sales for October are 
17,818 rupees for the treated group, compared to 17,764 for the untreated group. A t-test 
of equality has a p-value of 0.980. Thus again there is no evidence that reporting changed 
with treatment.
12 
                                                 
11 The main taxes affecting the firms in our sample are registration and assessment fees, if they register 
with the municipal government. Income taxes only apply for annual income above 300,000 rupees, which 
only applies to approximately 5 percent of our firms.  
12 Alternatively, we can look at the growth of sales between September, reported in the October survey 
before the round 3 treatment, and November, reported in January after the treatment. Again, we find no 
significant difference between the treated and untreated enterprises.   20
Together these results strongly suggest that the estimated returns are indeed true 
returns, and not merely a consequence of firms changing reporting of profits in response 
to treatment. We now turn to examining how the returns vary by type of treatment.   
 
Cash vs. Equipment Treatments and Linearity of Returns  
The analysis thus far has pooled together the treatments provided as cash and 
equipment, and the 10,000 and 20,000 rupee treatment levels. Table 6 examines whether 
the impact of the equipment treatment varies from that of the cash treatment. The first 
column repeats the overall treatment effect in row 3, Column 4 of Table 2. Column 2 then 
separates the treatment into two variables, one representing the equipment treatment 
amount and the other representing the cash treatment amount. We see that the coefficients 
on the equipment and cash treatments are nearly identical, 370 on equipment and 393 on 
cash.  Since we can not reject equality of the two treatment effects, we will continue to 
pool the two treatments in the remaining analysis.  
The third column of Table 6 uses two separate dummy variables to examine the 
impact of the 10,000 and 20,000 rupee treatments, with the sample excluding firms in the 
bamboo industry and trimmed at the 1
st and 99
th percentile of changes in profits. The 
10,000 treatment is estimated to raise net profits by 480 per month, compared to a 721 
increase for the 20,000 treatment. However, the standard errors in both point estimates 
are high. We can reject neither the hypothesis that the effect of the 20,000 treatment is 
twice that of the 10,000 treatment, nor the hypothesis that the two treatments have the 
same effect.    
Column 4 of Table 6 provides an alternative test of non-linearity of treatment 
effects by interacting the amount of the treatment with the baseline level of capital stock, 
exclusive of land and buildings. We also interact the period effects with this initial level 
of capital stock to allow for different growth paths of firms according to their initial 
capital stock levels. Column 4 shows the results after 1 percent trimming of firms on the 
basis of changes in profits. The interaction term is negative, which would suggest that the 
return to capital is decreasing, but is not statistically significant. 
As a further check as to whether the treatment effect varies with firm size, we use 
propensity score matching to match each treated firm which received the 10,000 rupee   21
treatment to its four closest non-treated firms based on baseline characteristics.
13 For each 
treated firm we can then calculate the difference between its change in profits from the 
baseline period and the change in profits of its four closest matches in each round after 
treatment. Figure 1 then plots these differences against the initial capital stock of the firm, 
using lowess for smoothing, along with a bootstrapped 95 percent confidence interval. A 
horizontal line is plotted at 381 rupees, the treatment effect in column 2 of Table 5. The 
figure shows the point estimate of the treatment effect is always above zero, and are 
reasonably flat, hovering close to the 381 line.  
Taken together, these results suggest that returns to capital are either linear or 
decreasing in the size of the firms. We find no evidence consistent with increasing returns 
at the range of capital stock represented by our firms.  
 
8. Explaining the high returns to Capital 
We find that the treatment increased real monthly business profits by 5.7 percent. 
Even if all these additional profits are consumed by the household and not compounded 
by reinvestment in the business, this would still give a real annual return of 68 percent. 
This greatly exceeds the market interest rate on loans being charged by banks and 
microfinance institutions. Typical nominal market interest rates are 16-24 percent per 
annum for two year loans. Assuming a 4 percent inflation rate, this equates to an effective 
annualized real rate of 12-20 percent per annum. The presence of these high marginal 
returns well in excess of the market interest rate therefore raises the question of why 
firms are underinvesting and not taking advantage of these high returns, an issue we 
address in this section. 
 
8.1. A Model of Heterogeneous Returns 
In the baseline survey, 78 percent of firm owners reported that their business was 
smaller than the size they would like. When asked what they view as constraints to the 
growth of their business, the most prevalent constraint reported is lack of finance, which 
                                                 
13 Firms were matched using on the basis of the entrepreneur’s age, sex, education, ability, religion, risk 
aversion, uncertainty, household size, number of workers in the household, household assets, and the firm’s 
industry, November 2004 profits, round 1 profits, legal registration status, location, and round 1 capital 
stock.    22
93 percent of firms say is a constraint. The second most prevalent constraint, lack of 
inputs, which 53 percent of firms list as constraint, is also likely to reflect in part liquidity 
constraints, as firms said that they couldn’t afford to buy all the inputs they would need. 
The perception of financial constraints is supported by the relatively rare use by firms of 
formal finance. Only 3.1 percent of our firms have a bank account for business use, and 
89 percent of firms got no start-up financing from a bank or microfinance organization. 
Formal credit is scarcely used at all for financing additional equipment purchases. Instead 
the major source of both start-up and ongoing funds is personal savings of the 
entrepreneur and loans from family. On average 69 percent of start-up funds came from 
this source, and 71 percent of firms relied entirely on own savings and family for start-up 
funds. 
After finance, the second most common set of constraints to growth according to 
the firms themselves can be broadly interpreted as reflecting uncertainty among firms 
about realizing the gains from investment. The possibility of lack of demand for products 
(which 34 percent of firms say is a constraint), lack of market information (16 percent say 
is a constraint), and economic policy uncertainty (15 percent say is a constraint) all 
suggest that the riskiness of returns could be important. Relatively few firms view the 
legal and regulatory framework as constraints to growth: 16 percent say lack of clear 
ownership of land, 6 percent say legal regulations, and only 1 percent say high tax rates is 
a constraint. Few firms view infrastructure as a constraint. 
These perceptions suggest that missing markets for credit or for insurance against 
risk could be important factors in explaining the high marginal returns to capital. These 
are two of the most common explanations considered in the literature.
14 We provide a 
simple model of microenterprise production to illustrate how these missing markets can 
give rise to marginal returns in excess of the market interest rate, and which can be used 
along with evidence of the heterogeneity of returns from our treatment to test whether 
missing credit or insurance markets is the more important factor driving high returns. 
                                                 
14 See Banerjee and Duflo (2005) for an excellent recent review of different explanations. Missing credit 
and insurance markets appear the most important for our setting among the different theories they 
summarize.   23
Consider a simple one-period model in which the enterprise owner supplies labor 
inelastically to the business.
15 The household has an endowment of assets A, and 
allocates the number of other working age adults in the household, n, to the labor market, 
where they are paid a fixed wage w. The household can finance capital stock (K) through 
the formal credit market by borrowing (B), and through its internal household capital 
market, by allocating AK of household assets and IK of household labor income to 
financing capital stock. 
The household’s problem is then to choose the amount of capital stock, K, to 
invest in the business, subject to its budget and borrowing constraints: 
    Max             EU(c) 
{K, B, Ak, Ik} 
Subject to: 









B I A K









− + − + − = θ ε
 
Where ε is a random variable with positive support and mean one, reflecting the fact that 
production is risky, and r is the market interest rate. The production function of the firm, 
f(.) depends on the level of capital stock, and on θ, the ability of the entrepreneur.  
With well-functioning credit and insurance markets, households will choose K to 
maximize expected profits and as a result, households choose K such that: 
() [] r K f E = θ ε , '  (6) 
Since E(ε)=1, this yields 
() r K f = θ , '    (7) 
That is, households will choose capital stock so that the marginal return to capital equals 
the market interest rate. In this case, the marginal return to capital will be the same for all 
firms, and will not depend on the characteristics of the owner or household.  
The more general solution to the household’s first-order condition for K is: 
                                                 
15 This simple model is an adaptation of the agricultural household model set out in Bardhan and Udry 

























θ    (8) 
where  λ is the lagrange-multiplier on condition (2), and is a measure of how tightly 
overall credit constraints bind. We can consider two sub-cases: 
a): perfect insurance markets, missing credit market. With perfect insurance, risk and 
uncertainty do not matter, and (5) reduces to  ( ) λ θ + = r K f , ' . That is, the marginal 
return will exceed the market interest rate by the shadow cost of capital. Solving the first-
order conditions for the optimal choices of B, IK and AK yields: 
1 + = + = = I A B r μ μ μ λ      (9) 
where  μB,  μA, and μI are the lagrange-multipliers on constraints (3), (4) and (5) 
respectively. Credit constraints will therefore be binding if and only if both the external 
(formal) and internal (household) credit markets are binding. Given the lack of access to 
bank finance seen in our firms, it therefore appears that the critical determinant of 
whether or not credit constraints bind will be the shadow cost of capital within the 
household.  
In our model λ will then depend on the amount of internal capital available, which 
is increasing in household assets A and in the number of workers n. However, it will also 
depend on what the firms’ unconstrained level of capital will be. If ability θ and capital 
are complements, then higher ability individuals will desire more capital, and so will be 
more likely to be constrained for a given level of assets and workers. 
As a result, if credit constraints are the reason for high returns, we predict that the 
marginal return to capital will be higher for firms with greater ability, lower for 
households with more workers, and lower for households with more liquid household 
assets. We will test for this by examining whether the effect of our treatments varies with 
these factors. 
b): perfect credit markets, missing insurance market.  
An alternative explanation for the high marginal returns could be that credit 
markets function well, but that households are risk averse and insurance markets are 
missing, In this case equation (8) simplifies to: 
  () ( ) () ( ) [] ( ) c EU K f r c U Cov K f ' , ' , ' , ' θ ε θ − =     (10)   25
Since consumption increases with ε, Cov(U’(c), ε)<0. Since U’(c) <0 this implies that 
() θ , ' K f r < .  The size of the gap between the market interest rate and the marginal 
return to capital will be increasing in the level of risk in business profits, and in the level 
of risk aversion displayed by the household. We test this by interacting the treatment 
effect with measures of the risk aversion of the entrepreneur, and the perceived 
uncertainty they have in their profits. 
 
8.2. Estimation of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects and Measurement of Factors 
Determining Heterogeneity. 
The above theory shows that the pattern of heterogeneity of treatment effects can 
inform us about the reasons why returns are so high and exceed market interest rates. We 
allow for heterogeneity in treatment effects through estimation of variants of the 
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The parameter γs then shows how the effect of the treatment amount varies with 
characteristic s.
16  Since the evolution of profits over time may vary with Xs,i,t even in the 
absence of treatment, we allow the wave effects δt to also differ with individual 
characteristics.  
The theoretical model suggests that the heterogeneity of returns could vary with the 
number of workers in the household, household wealth, entrepreneurial ability, risk 
aversion, and uncertainty. We measure each of these factors as follows: 
i)  The number of workers in the household is the number of paid wage workers 
in the household in the pre-treatment baseline survey.  
 
ii)  Household wealth is difficult to measure accurately, especially since liquid 
wealth should be more important for funding the household budget than 
                                                 
16 The upper limit of 100,000 rupees of capital stock may result in an interaction between ability and some 
of the characteristics we are interacting with the treatment. For example,an entrepreneur of a given ability 
level may stay within the sample criteria if there are no additional workers in the household, but grow 
beyond that limit if there are additional workers. The presence of additional workers would then be 
negatively correlated with entrepreneurial ability in the sample. This should be kept in mind when 
interpreting the coefficients on the interaction effects.     26
illiquid forms of wealth such as building quality. Following Filmer and 
Pritchett (2001) we proxy household wealth with the first principal component 
of a set of indicators of ownership of durable assets (such as fans, radios, 
cameras, televisions, bicycles, refrigerators and motorcycles). We again take 
this from the baseline survey, so that it is predetermined at the time of 
treatment. 
 
iii)  Entrepreneurial ability is a more nebulous concept, and so we explore several 
proxy measures. The first, and most standard in the literature (e.g. Paulson and 
Townsend 2004), is to use the number of years of education of the enterprise 
owner. Secondly, we follow Djankov et al. (2005) and use the score of the 
entrepreneur on a digit span recall test. Thirdly, we use the first principal 
component of years of education, digit span recall, time taken to solve a maze, 
and self-assessed efficacy in ability to carry out business tasks such as keeping 
accounts, making a sale to a new customer, and identifying market 
opportunities. This latter measure is a broad measure of entrepreneurial 
ability, and has a correlation of 0.64 with digit span and 0.79 with education. 
 
iv)  Risk aversion is measured from lottery experiments played with real money 
with each firm owner. Firm owners were given the choice between 40 rupees 
for certain, or a gamble with X percent chance of 10 rupees and 100-X percent 
chance of 100 rupees. A 10-sided dice was used to vary the odds of the higher 
payment from 10 percent up to 90 percent. The probability threshold at which 
an individual switches from the safe payment to the risky gamble then 
provides a measure of risk aversion, and can be used to derive the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion for a CRRA money utility function, which we take as 
our measure of risk aversion. 
 
v)  Uncertainty is measured by eliciting from firm owners their subjective 
distribution of firm profits (Manski, 2004; Lybbert et al, 2005). In the October 
2005 survey, firm owners were given a sheet with different ranges of profits, 
such as <500 rupees, 500-1000 rupees, 1000-1500 rupees, etc. They were then 
asked to place 20 marks in cells, representing how many firms just like theirs 
they think would have profits in each range in December 2005. We use these 
subjective distributions to estimate the coefficient of variation of expected 
profits, which we take as our measure of the riskiness of firm profits as 
perceived by the firm owner.  
 
 
8.3. Results on Treatment Effect Heterogeneity  
Table 7 presents the results from estimating equation (11) allowing for different 
forms of heterogeneity in the treatment effects. We estimate the return from the 
treatment, because risk and credit constraints could affect the proportion of cash 
treatments which were invested in the enterprise. Column 1 presents the overall treatment   27
effect, repeating row 3, column 4 of Table 2. Columns 2 through 6 examine whether 
returns are higher when credit constraints bind more tightly. About half of the households 
report having at least one paid wage worker We expect the shadow value of capital to be 
lower in households with wage workers, as the wages generate a source of funds for 
investing in the enterprise. We do find that having paid wage workers in the household is 
associated with lower returns from the treatment, an effect which is significant at the 5 
percent level. We also tested whether having other enterprises owned by household 
members might be associated with higher returns, as these enterprises provide competing 
uses for funds. In results not reported on table 7, we find that the presence of other 
enterprises is associated with higher returns, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
Column 4 shows a negative interaction effect with the household durable asset 
index, which is also consistent with a model of credit constraints. However, the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant. We note that households rely primarily on own 
savings rather than selling household assets when financing the business. Unfortunately 
we are not able to measure liquid savings of the household, preventing us from testing 
whether households with more liquid assets have lower returns.  
The most significant interaction effects are found for our various measures of 
entrepreneurial ability. Columns 5, 6 and 7 show that the interaction of the treatment 
amount with years of schooling, a digit span recall test, and our index of broad 
entrepreneurial ability. Each of our measures of entrepreneurial ability is positive and 
significant, education and the digit span test at the 5 percent level, and the broad index at 
the 10 percent level. These results imply that the treatment has a larger effect on more 
able entrepreneurs. This is again consistent with credit constraints, since it implies that 
the return deviates further from market interest rates for more able entrepreneurs. The 
interaction predicts negative or zero return on the treatment for the 20 percent of firm 
owners with 6 or fewer years of schooling, 2.2 percent monthly returns at the 25
th 
percentile of 8 years schooling, 5.0 percent monthly returns at the median education of 10 
years schooling, and 6.4 percent monthly returns at the 75
th percentile of 11 years 
schooling. The other measures of ability also give zero or slightly negative returns for the 
bottom of the ability distribution, and higher returns for the more able. For example, 15 
percent of firm owners could only recall 4 digits or less: they have negative estimated   28
returns. The median digit span recall is 6 digits, corresponding to an estimated return of 
4.8 percent. At the top of the distribution, 11 percent of firm owners could recall 8 or 
more digits, resulting in predicted returns of 13.6 percent per month. 
Column 8 shows no significant interaction of the treatment amount with risk 
aversion. Moreover, the sign of the coefficient is negative, suggesting that, if anything, 
firm owners which are more risk averse have lower returns.  Column 9 finds a negative 
coefficient on uncertainty of firm profits, which is significant at the 10 percent level. This 
would suggest firm owners facing more uncertainty have lower returns. This is evidence 
against the high marginal returns being caused by risk averse entrepreneurs operating 
with missing insurance markets, as this would predict that both coefficients would be 
significantly positive. 
Finally in Column 10 we consider the interactions together. The results are very 
similar to the regressions examining each effect individually. The interactions with the 
number of paid wage workers in the household and education are still positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level, confirming that the returns are highest for owners with 
more limited liquidity and more ability. Risk aversion is insignificant, and the measure of 
sales uncertainty has the unexpected sign and is significant at the 10 percent level. 
Taken together, the heterogeneity of returns supports the view that the high 
marginal returns from our treatments reflect credit constraints rather than missing 
insurance markets. Credit constraints are more binding, and thus marginal returns are 
higher, for more able entrepreneurs and for entrepreneurs with a high shadow cost of 




We find returns to capital for the average microenterprise firm in our sample to be 
very high, around 5.7 percent per month, or at least 68 percent per year. Returns appear to 
be flat or decreasing – we do not find evidence of increasing returns over our sample 
range. Marginal returns are highest for entrepreneurs with more ability and with fewer 
other workers in the household. These are the individuals who, all else equal, we would 
expect to be most credit constrained. In contrast, returns are not found to differ with risk   29
aversion of the entrepreneur, or with the perceived uncertainty of the entrepreneur about 
his or her profits. This suggests that missing credit markets rather than missing insurance 
markets is the main constraint on enterprise growth. 
The results have important implications for the way we think about both 
microenterprises and microfinance markets. The high returns are very low levels of 
capital stock imply that non-convex production sets are unlikely to lead to permanent 
poverty traps. The high returns also suggest that there will be demand for loans from 
microlenders, even at interest rates which are high enough to cover the administrative 
costs of making small loans.  
The fact that the returns exceed interest rates charged by microlenders in Sri 
Lanka by such a large margin also presents something of a puzzle. Sri Lanka has an 
active microfinance sector, with participation by both NGOs and government-run banks. 
Initial loan sizes are in the 10,000 rupee range, the same as our smaller treatment level. 
Do these enterprises lack credit because they have been screened out, in spite of the high 
returns? Or do they lack credit because they of a lack of demand, either because they are 
unaware of potential sources of credit or because they are unaware of the returns to 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Verification of Randomization
Total number of  Assigned to Assigned to T-test
Baseline Characteristic observations in R1. Mean Median Treatment Control p-value
Profits March 2005 388 3869 3000 3957 3748 0.539
Revenues March 2005 405 12250 7000 11936 12683 0.621
Total invested capital March 2005 405 147090 81500 156406 134213 0.330
Total invested capital excluding
  land and buildings March 2005 405 26652 18000 25963 27605 0.520
Own hours worked March 2005 405 52.7 50 52.0 53.7 0.440
Family hours worked March 2005 405 17.0 0 18.0 15.6 0.379
Age of entrepreneur 405 41.9 41 41.9 41.9 0.979
Age of firm in years 403 9.3 5 9.6 8.8 0.411
Proportion female 405 0.467 0.438 0.506 0.179
Years of schooling of entrepreneur 405 9.0 10 9.0 9.1 0.579
Proportion whose father was
 an entrepreneur 405 0.385 0.370 0.406 0.468
Proportion of firms which are
   Registered 405 0.225 0.243 0.200 0.312
Number of household members
  working in wage jobs 405 1.2 1 1.2 1.2 0.704
Household asset index 405 0.000 0.078 -0.178 0.246 0.018
Number of Digits recalled in
  Digit Span Recall test 375 5.8 6 5.8 5.8 0.684
Implied coefficient of relative
  risk aversion from lottery game 400 0.139 0.065 0.197 0.055 0.375
P-value from Chi-squared (16) test of joint significance in probit of treatment on these variables: 0.355
Means by Treatment
Full sample
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Table 2: Effect of Treatment on Profits
Random Fixed FE with FE with
Effects Effects 1% level trim 1% change trim
Impact of Treatment Amount on: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Nominal Profits 488.8** 568.7** 614.4*** 593.2***
(203) (235) (162) (198)
Real Profits 469.9** 542.8** 585.7*** 567.8***
(198) (231) (158) (193)
Real Profits less 5.43*own hours 407.0** 476.3** 519.3*** 498.1***
(196) (230) (157) (193)
Real Profits less 14.1*own hours 307.6 370.1 413.4** 386.9*
(197) (233) (162) (197)
Number of firms 383 383 382 360
Number of firm*time observations 1857 1857 1834 1749
Notes: All regressions also include period effects
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
Table 3: Return to Capital from Experiment
Dependent Variable: Real Profits less 5.43*own hours
IV-FE with IV-FE with IV-FE with IV-FE with
IV-RE IV-FE 1% level trim 1% change trim IV-RE IV-FE 1% level trim 1% change trim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Capital stock 537.5** 621.5** 680.5*** 686.3** 611.1** 670.7** 725.5*** 738.8***
(excluding land & buildings) (262) (316) (224) (286) (250) (312) (220) (281)
1% trimming of initial capital No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage
Coefficient on Treatment Amount 0.744 0.763 0.766 0.732 0.800 0.792 0.796 +0.762
F-statistic 41.99 46.10 45.83 45.56 48.86 50.41 50.27 50.69
Observations 1798 1798 1775 1691 1764 1764 1742 1657
Number of sheno 383 383 382 360 376 376 375 353
Notes: All regressions also include period effects
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  34
Table 4: Testing for Treatment Spillovers
Dependent Variable: Real Profits less 5.43*own hours
Columns 1-4 all firms; Columns 5-8 exclude bamboo industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE FE IV-FE IV-FE FE FE IV-FE IV-FE
Treatment Amount 504.6*** 506.4*** 385.1* 385.0*
(192) (193) (206) (206)
Capital stock 751.4*** 751.8*** 573.9** 574.7**
(excluding land & buildings) (281) (281) (278) (278)
Number of Firms in Industry Treated
Within 500m -150.9** -138.0* -99.23 -105.9
(65.3) (70.9) (138) (146)
Within 1km -60.34 -58.54 -49.80 -59.90
(43.2) (47.1) (82.0) (87.4)
Constant 2744*** 2744*** 768.7 767.0 2719*** 2719*** 1089 1087
(173) (173) (757) (757) (183) (183) (802) (803)
Observations 1749 1749 1657 1657 1605 1605 1518 1518
Number of sheno 360 360 353 353 331 331 325 325
Notes: All regressions also include period effects
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 5: Treatment effect and Returns to Capital after excluding Bamboo industry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE with FE with IV-FE with IV-FE with
1% level trim 1% change trim 1% level trim 1% change trim
Treatment Amount 408.9** 380.9*
(166) (206)
Capital stock 565.0*** 565.6**
(excluding land & buildings) (212) (278)
Constant 2669*** 2718*** 1055* 1110
(146) (183) (616) (803)
First-stage
Coefficient on Treatment Amount 0.842 0.805
F-statistic 47.20 46.92
Observations 1690 1605 1603 1518
Number of sheno 353 331 347 325
Notes: All regressions also include period effects
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Table 6: Cash Vs. Equipment and Linearity of Effects
Dependent Variable: Real Profits less 5.43*own hours, trimming at 1/99% on change in profits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE FE FE
Treatment Amount 380.9*
(206)
Equipment Treatment Amount 369.6
(262)
Cash Treatment Amount 392.6
(266)
Treated Amount 10,000 Rs. 479.7
(364)
Treated Amount 20,000 Rs. 720.7*
(437)
Treatment Amount (0, 1, 2) 544.4*
(312)
Treatment Amount * Initial Capital Stock -58.4
(77.4)
Constant 2718*** 2717*** 2714*** 2718***
(183) (183) (183) (183)
F-test of equality of treatment effects p-value 0.944 0.627
F-test p-value: 2*10,000 treatment  = 20,000 treatment 0.751
Firm-Period Observations 1605 1605 1606 1605
Number of Firms 331 331 331 331
Notes: All regressions also include period effects
Column 2 excludes firms ever receiving cash treatments, Column 3 excludes firms ever receiving 
equipment treatments. All other columns are for all firms.
Data were trimmed to remove firms with percentage change in profits less than -90%, or above +962%.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 7: Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: Real Profits less 5.43*own hours 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Treatment Amount 380.9* 724.9*** 404.2** -879.5 -2148* 348.6* 368.3* 997.1* 252.1
(206) (272) (215) (656) (987) (212) (212) (553) (882)
Interaction of Treatment Amount with:
Number of Wage Workers -522.3** -579.0**
(261) (282)
Household Asset Index -107.8 -87.6
(134) (148)




Broad Entrepreneurial Ability 353.8*
(187)




Constant 2717*** 2718*** 2718*** 2714*** 2708*** 2702*** 2721*** 2734*** 2733***
(183) (183) (183) (183) (186) (189) (184) (184) (184)
Firm-period observations 1605 1605 1605 1605 1580 1549 1605 1587 1587
Number of firms 331 331 331 331 324 316 331 327 327
Notes: All regressions include period effects, the interaction of period effects with the variables being interacted with treatment amount, and 
firm fixed effects. 
Data were trimmed to remove firms with percentage change in profits less than -90%, or above +962%.
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Figure 1: Returns to Treatment Estimated Using Four Nearest Neighbors 